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CRIMINAL LAW—THE CALL FOR AN ADEQUATE REMEDY: THE LACK OF
DETERRENCE AND JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR PROSECUTORS WHO
HABITUALLY VIOLATE BATSON
I. INTRODUCTION
For over twenty-two years, from 1997 to 2019, the State of Mississippi
put Curtis Flowers, a man accused of capital murder, through a series of
unfortunate events.1 Three conviction reversals and two hung juries led
Flowers to a sixth trial, which he subsequently appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States.2 During the first four trials, the State exercised its
peremptory challenges to exclude “as many black prospective jurors as possible.”3 The fifth trial ended in a hung jury that led to a sixth trial.4 With the
sixth trial ending in Flowers’s conviction, the Supreme Court of the United
States addressed whether the State violated Batson5 in employing peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors.6 The Court concluded that the
State had in fact violated Batson, and it therefore reversed the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Mississippi.7
Through all six trials, Doug Evans served as the state prosecutor.8 Following the Court’s ruling, Evans was found to have committed prosecutorial
misconduct and Batson violations throughout four of the six trials.9 Even
with these offenses, however, the Mississippi trial court did not impose any
penalties on Evans, nor did the Supreme Court of the United States scold
Evans by name in its opinion.10 Flowers’s unfortunate case is only one example of many demonstrating the ineffective procedure established in Batson to end racial discrimination in jury selection.11 This ineffectiveness is
due in part to Batson’s sole inquiry of whether there was purposeful dis-

1. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2236 (2019).
2. Id. at 2235.
3. Id. at 2246.
4. Id. at 2235.
5. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235.
7. See id.
8. Curtis Gilbert et al., Reversed: Curtis Flowers Wins Appeal at U.S. Supreme Court,
APM REPORTS (June 21, 2019), https://www.apmreports.org/story/2019/06/21/curtis-flowerswins-scotus-appeal.
9. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2234–35.
10. See Gilbert et al., supra note 8.
11. See infra Part III.
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crimination.12 Further, as the procedure and law currently stand, there are no
consequences that deter Batson violators from becoming repeat discrimination offenders, such as Evans in Flowers.13
Flowers presents a clear example of how Batson cannot fully eradicate
racial discrimination in jury selection.14 The Batson procedure does not provide a deterrent for prosecutors who regularly exclude black prospective
jurors.15 The Flowers Court ultimately reached the proper judgment, but the
Court did not resolve the common practice of prosecutors employing racial
discrimination in jury selection within state trial courts.16 To fight this issue,
this note proposes that courts impose consequences such as sanctions and
disqualification from participation in retrial on prosecutors who are shown
to exclude minorities from jury service repeatedly.17
To support this proposition, Part II of this note will detail the evolution
of the law used to combat racial discrimination in jury selection. Part III
provides evidence that racially discriminatory practices by prosecutors are
still prevalent today. Part III further explains why the application of Batson
is insufficient to eradicate racial discrimination in jury selection. Part IV of
this note argues that courts should impose penalties on prosecutors who repeatedly exclude black prospective jurors to (1) promote the interest of justice and equal protection and (2) maintain the integrity of the legal profession as outlined in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Part IV of this
note also argues that eliminating peremptory challenges is a radical and irrational remedy.
II. THE HISTORICAL STEPS TO COMBAT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
was the first step on a long road to equality under the law for black citi12. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986); id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
13. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY
SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 45–46 (2010), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegalracial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf (“One of the most vexing aspects of the continuing
problem of racial discrimination in jury selection is impunity. In most cases where a court
finds that a prosecutor intentionally has engaged in racial discrimination while selecting a
jury, the prosecutor suffers no adverse consequences.” (emphasis omitted))
14. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235–36; Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
15. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–07 (Marshall, J., concurring).
16. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235.
17. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 45 (arguing that “prosecutors who
are found to have engaged in” racial discrimination during jury selection “should be disqualified from participation in . . . retrial” and be subject to fines or other penalties).
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zens.18 Although the amendment provided legal protection against discrimination, eradicating discrimination in the judicial system was troublesome.19
Since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court of
the United States has struggled with finding a proper procedure to promote
the principles of the amendment without interfering with the adversarial
process.20
A.

Post-Civil War

For United States citizens, serving on a jury, similar to voting, is both a
duty and a privilege.21 In protecting these privileges, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”22 The
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, did not end the longterm fight for civil rights by minority groups, especially the right to sit on a
jury.23 In addition to the protections provided in the Constitution, the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 provides that “[n]o citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service
as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”24 Even with the
law on their side, minorities were still often not afforded a true opportunity
to participate in juries.25
B.

Swain and Batson

The 1965 case, Swain v. Alabama, was the Supreme Court’s first ruling
on the issue of racial discrimination in jury selection in the twentieth century.26 In Swain, the defendant was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death in Talladega, Alabama.27 For more than a decade, no black
juror had served on a jury in Talladega County.28 On appeal, Swain argued
that the prosecutor’s striking of all six qualified black prospective jurors was

18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
19. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 9–10.
20. See id. at 9–13.
21. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
23. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238–39; see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 304 (1879).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2018); EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 9.
25. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 9–10.
26. See id. at 12.
27. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2240.
28. Id.
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unconstitutional under Strauder v. West Virginia.29 The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument.30 The Court held that a defendant can
demonstrate racial discrimination by providing evidence that the State systematically employed peremptory challenges so no black juror could ever
serve on a jury.31 Over twenty years later, the Court overruled this incredibly
high standard.32
Overruling Swain in part, Batson held that a defendant may present a
prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection by
relying on the facts in his own case.33 Batson found that the Swain evidentiary standard was too harsh.34 The Court held that a defendant must show
“relevant facts [that] give[] rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”35
Relevant facts may include evidence concerning purposeful racial discrimination in his case or proof that a particular jurisdiction has a history of systemic discrimination.36 The procedure has not changed since this 1986 decision.37
III. IMPLICATIONS OF BATSON
Since Batson, the issue of racial discrimination in jury selection continues to be litigated, and statistics show that some jurisdictions have a history of striking black jurors.38 As discussed supra, Flowers v. Mississippi
demonstrates one prosecutor’s habitual misuse of peremptory challenges for
a discriminatory purpose.39 This case, as detailed below, is only one of
many.
A.

Flowers v. Mississippi

Flowers is a black male whom the State of Mississippi charged with the
murder of four people in Winona in 1996.40 “Three of the four victims [in
29. Id. (referring to Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
33. Id. at 93, 95.
34. Id. at 92–93.
35. Id. at 93–94.
36. See id. at 94–95.
37. See generally Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019) (“[W]e break no
new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce Batson . . . .”).
38. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 5–7.
39. See supra Part I.
40. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2234. Winona was a small town with a population of about
5000 people. Id. at 2236. The racial make-up of the town is about fifty-three percent black
and about forty-six percent white. Id.
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the case] were white.”41 Flowers was tried six separate times before a jury
for murder, and, as discussed supra, Evans represented the State in all six
trials.42 In the first trial, the jury convicted Flowers, but the Supreme Court
of Mississippi reversed the conviction due to “numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct.”43 There were thirty-six prospective jurors—five black
and thirty-one white.44 “The State exercised . . . twelve peremptory strikes,”
and of the twelve, “it used five of them to strike [all] five qualified black
prospective jurors.”45 “Flowers objected, arguing under Batson that the
State” employed its peremptory strikes for purposeful racial discrimination.46 “The trial court rejected the Batson challenge.”47 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi did not reach Flowers’s Batson argument because the court reversed on prosecutorial misconduct.48
In the second trial, the trial court found that the prosecutor discriminated on the basis of race in the peremptory challenge of a black juror.49 Five of
the venirepersons were black, and twenty-five were white.50 The State once
“again used its strikes against all five black prospective jurors.”51 The defense made a Batson challenge, and “the trial court determined that the
State’s asserted reason for one of the strikes was a pretext for discrimination.”52 The State provided a false allegation that the juror was “inattentive”
and “nodding off during jury selection.”53 That black juror sat with eleven
white jurors.54 The jury convicted Flowers, but the Supreme Court of Mississippi again ruled Evans committed prosecutorial misconduct and reversed
Flowers’s conviction.55
In the third trial, the jury convicted Flowers once again.56 During voir
dire, seventeen black jurors and twenty-eight white jurors made up the potential jury pool, totaling forty-five prospective jurors.57 The State struck one
of the black prospective jurors for cause, leaving sixteen black venireper-

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 327 (2000)).
Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2237.
Id. at 2236.
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sons.58 The State used all fifteen of its peremptory strikes against the black
prospective jurors.59 Flowers again asserted a Batson violation, but the trial
court ruled the State did not “discriminate[] on the basis of race.”60 The jury
“consisted of eleven white jurors and one black juror” because the State
used all of its peremptory strikes.61 “On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi . . . again reversed, concluding that the State had again violated Batson. . . .”62
Flowers’ fourth and fifth trials ended in mistrials due to hung juries.63
The fourth trial had thirty-six prospective jurors—sixteen black and twenty
white.64 The State exercised eleven peremptory strikes, using all eleven
against black venirepersons.65 Because the State ran out of peremptory challenges, however, “[t]he seated jury consisted of seven white jurors and five
black jurors.”66 Racial information about the prospective jurors participating
in voir dire for the fifth trial was not available.67 The racial information of
the final jury panel was provided—three black jurors sat for trial.68
During the sixth trial, the jury convicted and sentenced Flowers to
death.69 There were twenty-six prospective jurors—six black and twenty
white.70 During voir dire, the State struck five of the six black prospective
jurors.71 Flowers argued that the State employed its peremptory challenges
with discriminatory intent.72 The trial court rejected Flower’s argument,
“conclud[ing] that the State had offered race-neutral reasons for each . . .
strike[].”73 On appeal, Flowers renewed his argument that the State violated
Batson in exercising peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors, but
the Supreme Court of Mississippi agreed with the trial court.74 Flowers petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Court vacated the
judgment and remanded for a decision consistent with the holding in Foster
v. Chatman.75 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2236–37.
See id. at 2237.
Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2237.
Id. (referring to Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016)).

2020]

THE CALL FOR AN ADEQUATE REMEDY

267

reaffirmed Flowers’s conviction.76 Flowers once again appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.77
In its final review, the Supreme Court of the United States applied the
principles in Batson for four reasons.78 First, the history from Flowers’s six
trials created an inference of discriminatory intent.79 Second, in the sixth
trial, the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes against five of the six black
prospective jurors supported an inference of discrimination.80 Third, the
gross disparity in questioning of black and white jurors at the sixth trial was
evidence of racially discriminatory intent.81 Last, the prosecutor’s proffered
reason for striking black juror, Carolyn Wright, suggested discriminatory
intent because the prosecutor accepted other similarly-situated white jurors.82 Following this finding of a Batson violation, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for new trial.83
B.

Recent Cases of Batson Violators

While Flowers presents a set of extraordinary facts, several cases support that racial discrimination in jury selection is far from eradicated in this
country.84 Some cases even provide historical evidence of discrimination by
the State in a specific jurisdiction, just like Flowers.85 A comparable case to
Flowers that displays racial discrimination is Miller-El v. Dretke.86
1.

Miller-El v. Dretke

Texas charged Thomas Miller-El with capital murder for shooting and
killing a Holiday Inn employee in late 1985 during a robbery in Dallas, Tex76. Id. at 2238.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 2244.
79. Id. at 2245–46.
80. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2246.
81. Id. at 2246–47.
82. Id. at 2248–51.
83. Id. at 2251.
84. See generally, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1742–43 (2016) (holding
that a Georgia prosecutor violated Batson when he struck four qualified black jurors); Purkett
v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 777–78 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s unnecessary
tolerance of silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations . . . demeans the importance of the
values vindicated by our decision in Batson.”); Ronald F. Wright et al., The Jury Sunshine
Project: Jury Selection Data as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407, 1410 (2018)
(“Our analysis shows that prosecutors in North Carolina—a state with demographics and
legal institutions similar to those in many other states—excluded nonwhite jurors about twice
as often as . . . white jurors.”).
85. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
86. Id.
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as.87 During jury selection, the prosecutors used peremptory strikes against
ten of eleven qualified black prospective jurors.88 Miller-El objected, claiming that the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office had a history of employing peremptory challenges to strike black jurors, rendering the strikes in
Miller-El’s case illegitimate.89 Because the trial was before Batson, the trial
court denied Miller-El’s request for a new jury because he did not meet his
burden under Swain, the controlling law at the time.90 The jury convicted
Miller-El and sentenced him to death.91 Miller-El appealed.92
The Supreme Court of the United States decided Batson while the appeal was pending, so the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the
matter to the trial court in light of the Batson decision.93 The trial court once
again found no demonstration of the prosecutors striking black jurors because of race, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.94 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari following
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of MillerEl’s Batson claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.95
The Court applied an almost identical analysis as in Flowers.96 The
Court evaluated the disparity between white and black jurors selected—in
this case, the prosecutor employed peremptory strikes to exclude ninety-one
percent of the eligible black prospective jurors.97 It applied the side-by-side
comparison of black and white venire panelists who are similarly situated.98
It also criticized the prosecutor’s mischaracterizations of a qualified black
prospective juror.99
The primary similarity to Flowers, however, is the evidence supporting
a prosecutorial trend of discrimination against black prospective jurors in
voir dire.100 The prosecutors employed a procedure in Texas known as the
jury shuffle to exclude black jurors.101 In Texas’s criminal procedure, “either
side may literally reshuffle the cards bearing panel members’ names, thus
87. Id. at 235–36.
88. Id. at 240–41 (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 331 (2003)).
89. Id. at 236.
90. See id.
91. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 236.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 236–37.
95. Id. at 237.
96. See id. at 240–53.
97. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240–41 (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342
(2003)).
98. See id. at 241–52.
99. Id. at 242–44.
100. See id. at 253.
101. See id. at 253–55.
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rearranging the order in which members of a venire panel are seated and
reached for questioning.”102 Once the new order is established, the venire
members who are “not questioned by the end of the week are dismissed,”
causing those seated in the back to have a higher probability of dismissal
from voir dire.103
Last, the evidence of an explicit discriminatory policy of the Dallas
County District Attorney’s Office was the smoking gun.104 A Dallas County
district judge testified that during his time working in the District Attorney’s
Office from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, “‘his superior warned him’”
that permitting any blacks on the jury would cost him his job.105 “[A]nother
Dallas County district judge and former assistant district attorney [of the
office] from 1976 to 1978 [also] testified that he believed” there was an office policy of excluding black citizens from serving on juries.106 To further
support the judges’ testimonies, the defense presented evidence of adoption
of “a formal policy to exclude minorities from jury service.”107 Cases such
as Flowers and Miller-El highlight that racial discrimination in jury selection is not just a coincidence or sporadic occurrence, but rather a “common
and flagrant” practice.108
2.

Foster v. Chatman

In Foster v. Chatman, the nature of the racial discrimination in jury selection was not as systematic as in Miller-El but was nonetheless obvious.109
Timothy Foster confessed to killing a seventy-nine-year-old woman in
Rome, Georgia.110 During voir dire, the State employed peremptory challenges to strike all four black prospective jurors.111 Subsequently, the jury
convicted Foster for capital murder and sentenced him to death.112 “The trial
court . . . rejected Foster’s Batson claim.”113
During the state habeas proceeding, the court admitted a series of documents from the State’s file into evidence.114 These documents included four
copies of the jury venire list with black prospective jurors highlighted in
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 253.
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 253.
See id. at 263.
Id. at 264 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 334 (2003)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003)).
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring).
See generally Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
Id. at 1743.
Id. at 1742.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1743–44.
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green and a “legend . . . indicat[ing] that the green highlighting ‘represents
Blacks.’”115 The court also admitted handwritten documents with notations
such as “NO. No Black Church,” listing all the black prospective jurors under “definite NO’s,” and labeling a few black potential jurors “B#1,” “B#2,”
and “B#3.”116 Even with evidence of this notation, the Supreme Court of
Georgia rejected Foster’s Batson argument.117
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Supreme Court of
Georgia’s decision, finding that “the prosecution’s file plainly demonstrate[d] a concerted effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury.”118
As suggested by the Court’s language, the prosecution’s conduct in this case
was a team effort and likely resulted from office culture.119 Although Foster
did not introduce historic evidence, the prosecution acted deliberately and
intentionally.120
3.

Racial Discrimination Beyond the South

Although the cases presented originated in the South, the misuse of
peremptory challenges to strike black jurors is not limited to southern jurisdictions.121 In January 2019, the American Civil Liberties Union filed an
amicus brief on behalf of a California prisoner whom an all-white jury convicted and sentenced to death.122 With the first trial resulting in a hung jury,
the prosecutor struck all prospective black jurors in both proceedings—three
in the first trial and four in the second.123 The prosecutor reasoned that the
jurors’ acceptance of the O.J. Simpson verdict was the basis for striking;
however, the State did not strike non-black jurors for also accepting the O.J.
Simpson verdict.124 Another example of this practice in a non-southern jurisdiction is Purkett v. Elem.125 In this situation, a Missouri prosecutor used

115. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1744.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1745.
118. Id. at 1755.
119. See id. at 1744, 1755.
120. See id. at 1744.
121. See Jim Craig, Fighting Racism in Jury Selection, RODERICK & SOLANGE
MACARTHUR JUST. CTR. (June 27, 2019), https://www.macarthurjustice.org/blog/fightingracism-in-jury-selection/ (“This evil [of racially based jury selection practices] isn’t limited to
courts in the South”); see generally also, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995);
Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU, the ACLU of Southern California, and the Roderick and
Solange MacArthur Justice Center, in Support of Petitioner at 2, Smith v. California, 139 S.
Ct. 2774 (2019) (No. 18-7094), 2019 WL 315285, at *2 [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief].
122. See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 121, at 2, 2019 WL 315285, at *2.
123. Id. at 4–5, 2019 WL 315285, at *4–*5.
124. Id. at 5, 2019 WL 315285, at *5.
125. 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995) (per curiam).
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peremptory challenges to strike two black men.126 The prosecutor’s basis for
striking the two men was their hair and facial hair.127 Although these two
examples are pebbles in a large pond, they provide evidence that racial discrimination in jury selection is not a southern issue but a national one.128
C.

Jurisdictions with Historical Discrimination

Some jurisdictions have a record of racial discrimination in jury selection. In Houston County, Alabama, from 2005 to 2009, prosecutors used
peremptory strikes to exclude eighty percent of the black qualified prospective jurors in death penalty cases.129 In Dallas County, Alabama, the prosecutor’s office used 157 of 199 peremptory strikes to eliminate black prospective jurors in twelve reported cases since Batson.130 In Louisiana, both
the Caddo Parish and the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Offices have a
history of significant disparities in the use of peremptory challenges against
white and black venire members.131 In Jefferson Parish, prosecutors struck
black prospective jurors “at more than three times the rate” of white prospective jurors between 1994 and 2002.132 In Caddo Parish between 2003
and 2012, some individual prosecutors struck black prospective jurors four
to five times more often than prospective jurors who were not black.133 Prosecutors in the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit in Georgia used eighty-three
percent of their peremptory strikes against blacks in the years before and
after Batson.134 These statistics further support that racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges are not isolated incidents, but rather a calculated
strategy in some jurisdictions.135

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
See Craig, supra note 121.
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 14.
Id.
See URSULA NOYE, REPRIEVE. AUSTL., BLACKSTRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY
DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE CADDO PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE 2 (2015), http://www.criiasupr.org/multimedia/documents/Blackstrikes%20Caddo
%20Parish%20August%202015.pdf; see also RICHARD BOURKE ET AL., LA. CRISIS
ASSISTANCE CTR., BLACK STRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE JEFFERSON PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 1 (2003),
https://capitalpunishmentincontext.org/files/resources/race/BlackStrikes.pdf.
132. BOURKE, supra note 131, at 7.
133. NOYE, supra note 131, at 2, 11.
134. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 14.
135. See id. at 6.
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IV. CREATING AN ADEQUATE REMEDY
As discussed supra, it is evident that racial discrimination in jury selection is far from eradicated.136 Thirty-five years removed from the Batson
decision, defendants still have the potential of facing all-white juries as a
result of the unlawful and discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.137
Batson does not quite hit the mark, so other remedies must be explored to
eradicate the improper use of peremptory challenges.
A.

How Batson Falls Short

Concurring in the Batson decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall predicted the trend exhibited in Flowers more than thirty years prior.138 He recognized that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges “ha[d] become
both common and flagrant.”139 Justice Marshall further predicted that simply
changing the evidentiary standard for a prima facie case of purposeful racial
discrimination would not eliminate racial discrimination from the juryselection process.140 He argued that prosecutors can offer any race-neutral
reason for employing a peremptory challenge, and “trial courts are ill
equipped to second-guess those reasons.”141 Although he agreed with the
majority opinion, Justice Marshall suggested going a step further by creating
an adequate remedy to eradicate racial discrimination.142
The majority “d[id] not share” in Justice Marshall’s skepticism.143 The
majority instead contended that prosecutors would “fulfill their duty to exercise their challenges only for legitimate purposes” and trusted in the supervision of the trial court judges during voir dire.144 The majority believed that
the standard adopted in Batson would ensure that a State did not employ
peremptory challenges to strike black jurors on the basis of race.145 Flowers,
a case beginning only about ten years after Batson, however, supports Justice Marshall’s contention that Batson was not sufficient to eliminate racial
discrimination in jury selection.146 The three main reasons the Batson procedure falls short are 1) the acceptance of any race-neutral reason to overcome
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
(2019).

See supra Part III.
See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 121, at 2, 2019 WL 315285, at *2.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 103.
See id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
See id. at 105.
Id. at 99 n.22.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22.
See id.
See id. at 102–03; see generally Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2234–38
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Batson challenges; 2) the lack of remedy for the violation; and 3) the inability to resolve the ongoing community impact.
1.

Any Race-Neutral Reason Is Acceptable

When a defendant provides sufficient evidence to support a prima facie
case under Batson, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide a raceneutral reason for the State’s peremptory strikes against minorities.147 As
Justice Marshall predicted, this burden over the course of time has conditioned prosecutors simply to learn how to play the game.148 Prosecutors have
attempted a myriad of race-neutral reasons for employing peremptory strikes
and are successful in the trial courts.149 In an Illinois case, the judge listed
several race-neutral explanations that have been successful in state trial
courts.150 These include but are not limited to: “too old,” “too young,” “single,” “over-educated,” “renter,” “lack of family contact,” “juror lived
alone,” “unemployed spouse,” and hair style.151
2.

Inadequate Remedy for the Violation

Another issue is the Batson holding does not go far enough to provide
“a remedy adequate to eliminate [] discrimination.”152 As evident in Flowers, the risk of re-trying a case is not a strong enough deterrent to eradicate
racial discrimination from jury selection.153 Flowers was tried six times, and
the prosecutor employed peremptory challenges to strike black jurors in four
out of those six trials.154 Jurisdictions, such as Dallas County, Alabama, have
a history of excluding blacks from juries.155 Unfortunately, these common
occurrences several years after Batson prove that the holding was not the
deterrent that the Batson Court hoped for.156
Contrary to the Batson Court’s assertion, it is also evident in Flowers
that the State has not always upheld its duty to employ peremptory challenges for legitimate purposes.157 To their dismay, defendants who fall vic-

147. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94.
148. See id. at 106; see also Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge,
and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1706 (2006).
149. See People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65–66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
153. See generally Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2234–35 (2019).
154. See id.
155. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 14.
156. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22.
157. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2234–35; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22.
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tim to these unlawful acts usually pay the price.158 Although Mississippi
dismissed the charges against him, Flowers spent twenty-three years “locked
in a box.”159 The facts of Flowers’s case only demonstrate that Batson fails
to provide an adequate remedy for such a severe constitutional violation.160
3.

Unable to Resolve Ongoing Community Impact

A component that is sometimes forgotten is how racial discrimination
in jury selection affects the community at large.161 Justice Powell stated that
“[d]iscrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious because it is
‘a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
[black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.’”162 This does not apply only to defendants, but to prospective black
jurors as well.163 Discriminatory peremptory challenges lead citizens to
question the fairness of our country’s justice system.164
B.

What Kind of Remedy

It is clear that the Batson procedure is not a catch all in addressing discriminatory peremptory challenges. As Justice Marshall suggested, a more
adequate remedy is necessary.165 The majority in the Batson decision suggested two possible options: 1) discharge the venire and select a new petit
jury, or 2) reinstate the improperly challenged juror.166 Viewing the Court’s
suggestion as a default rule rather than a mandate, some states even tried
enacting their own remedies.167 Justice Marshall believed an adequate reme158. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 13.
159. Jason Slotkin, After 6 Trials, Prosecutors Drop Charges Against Curtis Flowers,
NPR (Sept. 5, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/05/910061573/after-6-trialsprosecutors-drop-charges-against-curtis-flowers (“I am finally free from the injustice that left
me locked in a box for nearly twenty three years . . . .”); see Rick Rojas, After 6 Murder
Trials and 23 Years, Curtis Flowers Is Granted Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/16/us/curtis-flowers-murder.html.
160. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2234–35.
161. See Nancy S. Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson and the
Peremptory Challenge, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1185 (2017).
162. Batson, 478 U.S. at 87–88 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1880)) (alteration in original).
163. Id. at 87; Marder, supra note 161, at 1185.
164. Batson, 478 U.S. at 87; Marder, supra note 161, at 1191.
165. See Batson, 478 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
166. See id. at 99 n.24 (majority opinion).
167. See Marder, supra note 161, at 1176–80 (analyzing the short-lived North Carolina
Racial Justice Act of 2009 which provided the remedy of taking the death penalty “off the
table” for capital cases and allowed defendants to prove that race was “a significant factor” in
jury selection); see also Jason Mazzone, Batson Remedies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1613, 1624–25
(2012).
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dy must deter racial discrimination in the criminal justice system.168 Two
remedies that focus on this goal are sanctions and the disqualification from
participation in re-trial.169
1.

Sanctions

Very few states employ sanctions as a remedy in criminal proceedings,
but that does not make them any less effective.170 Comparatively, in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 outlines the procedure for the
issuance of sanctions.171 Rule 11 was enacted to encourage “lawyers [to] act
more responsibly to the court.”172 In efforts to achieve that goal, subdivision
(c) was drafted as a deterrent from irresponsible behavior by attorneys.173
The Advisory Committee viewed monetary sanctions as a penalty for lawyers who violated Rule 11(b).174
Prosecutors, like civil litigators, are responsible to the courts.175 Courts
have no reason to believe that monetary sanctions in civil litigation would
not also be an effective deterrent in a criminal trial. Some states, like California, seem to agree and have expanded their civil procedure sanction rule
to criminal trials.176 The Supreme Court of California has also supported the
use of monetary sanctions as a remedy for Batson violations in some situations.177 As discussed supra, the remedy should deter and eliminate racial
discrimination in jury selection.178 Imposing sanctions on prosecutors who
repeatedly employ racially discriminatory peremptory challenges can be an
adequate remedy.
168. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”)
169. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 45.
170. See, e.g., People v. Muhammad, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 317–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(discussing sanctions in the context of improper peremptory challenges under California
law).
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
172. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RULE 11 SANCTIONS § 1.03
(2004).
173. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
175. See Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function, A.B.A. (2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthE
dition/#:~:text=(a)%20The%20prosecutor%20should%20act,defendant%2C%20victims
%2C%20and%20witnesses (“The prosecutor is . . . an officer of the court.”).
176. See People v. Muhammad, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing
People v. Tabb, 279 Cal. Rptr. 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)).
177. See Mazzone, supra note 167, at 1624–25.
178. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986); People v. Johnson, 765 N.Y.S.2d
199, 201 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (“Since the goal of Batson is the elimination of racial discrimination
in jury selection, it is counterproductive to fail to sanction purposeful discrimination in jury
selection by forfeiting the disputed challenge.”).
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In practice, this remedy will act as an extra step to Batson. Initially, the
defendant must show a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination as held
in Batson.179 To employ sanctions as a remedy, the defendant must allege
that the prosecutor has demonstrated a history of racial discrimination in
jury selection. Facts demonstrating a history of discrimination include the
exclusion of a racial group from jury selection over an extended period of
time,180 office policies that promote the use of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges,181 previous findings of Batson violations in earlier trials,182 and any other proof of systemic exclusion of a particular racial
group.183 If a defendant does not allege facts to infer a discriminatory history, the court may not issue monetary sanctions. If the court finds a Batson
violation, similar to in civil proceedings, a defendant may move for the imposition of monetary sanctions or the court itself may issue monetary sanctions as an adequate remedy.
2.

Disqualification from Participation in the Re-trial

In Swain v. Alabama, the Court acknowledged that a State’s “purposeful or deliberate” exclusion of blacks from jury selection due to their race
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.184 The
key words are “purposeful” and “deliberate.” Because the employment of
peremptory challenges for a racially discriminatory purpose is no accident, a
prosecutor who uses this strategy should not reap the benefits of preparing
for re-trial.185 That same prosecutor, if given the opportunity, may employ
the same discriminatory strategy but simply try to use different discriminatory tactics. To eradicate the implicit advantage of re-trial, appellate courts
should issue the disqualification of Batson violators in the new trial.
As an example, the prosecutor in Flowers used five of his six peremptory challenges in the sixth trial against five black prospective jurors, “leav-

179. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94.
180. See id. at 94.
181. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 264 (2005) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 334–35 (2003)).
182. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2246 (2019).
183. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–95.
184. Id. at 84 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203–04 (1965)).
185. Cf. People v. Willis, 43 P.3d 130, 137 (Cal. 2002) (“[S]ituations can arise in which
the remedy of mistrial and dismissal of the venire accomplish nothing more than to reward
improper voir dire challenges and postpone trial. Under such circumstances, and with the
assent of the complaining party, the trial court should have the discretion to issue appropriate
orders short of outright dismissal of the remaining jury, including assessment of sanctions
against counsel whose challenges exhibit group bias and reseating any improperly discharged
jurors if they are available to serve.”).
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ing one black juror to sit on the jury.”186 As the Flowers Court recognized,
however, precedent views every racially motived peremptory strike as a
constitutional violation.187 It is simply unjust to subject a defendant to the
same prosecutor who demonstrated discriminatory intent due to the nature
of the violation and the purposeful nature of the act. As the Flowers Court
emphasized, “[i]n the eyes of the Constitution, one racially discriminatory
peremptory strike is one too many.”188 Now, imagine if Evans was disqualified from participating in the fourth trial.189 The likelihood of there being a
sixth trial becomes slimmer because Evans could not continue his purposeful and deliberate acts of discrimination.
C.

Reasons for Imposing These Remedies

The remedies previously discussed not only serve as a deterrent to future misuse of peremptory challenges but, more importantly, promote key
principles of this country’s criminal justice system. Sanctions and disqualifications from participation in re-trial 1) promote the interest of justice in
criminal trials and 2) protect the integrity of the legal profession.
1.

To Promote the Interest of Justice in Criminal Trials

Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides when a
motion for a new trial may be granted.190 A court may “vacate a[] judgment
and grant a new trial” is when “the interest of justice so requires.”191 The
Batson Court has also suggested this as a remedy.192 As previously discussed, the threat of a new trial is an inadequate remedy. What good is having a new trial if the same wrongdoing can occur?
Prosecutors bear the burden of representing two interests: the state and
justice.193 Justice, however, does not exclusively relate to convictions.194 To
promote the interest of justice in criminal trials, prosecutors must refrain
from using racially discriminatory peremptory challenges.195 A prosecutor
must recognize that justice is not exclusively for the victim.196 It is for the
186. Flowers, 139 U.S. at 2237.
187. See id. at 2242.
188. Id. at 2241.
189. See generally id. at 2236–37.
190. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a).
191. Id.
192. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.24 (1986).
193. Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a Color-Conscious
Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1571 (2012).
194. See id.
195. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86–87.
196. See id. at 87.
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juror who seeks to fulfill his or her civic duty.197 It is for the defendant who
is entitled to a fair and impartial jury of his or her peers.198 It is for the community members who trust their government officials to execute and protect
the principles and laws of our country.199 When evaluating all those affected
by racially discriminatory peremptory challenges, judges should be persuaded to create a remedy to match the severity of the violation.
2.

To Protect the Integrity of the Legal Profession

In 2005, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Principles
for Juries and Jury Trials as a set of standards for litigators and judges.200
ABA Principle 11 states that “courts should ensure that the process used to
empanel jurors effectively serves the goal of assembling a fair and impartial
jury.”201 Principle 11 further rejects the use of peremptory challenges to
dismiss a juror for unconstitutional reasons.202 The principle outlines the
steps in addressing a Batson challenge.203
Additionally, the principle provides that in a case where a party employed a peremptory challenge in a constitutionally impermissible manner, a
“court should deny the challenge and, after consultation with counsel, determine whether further remedy is appropriate.”204 Essentially, the ABA
suggests that the courts have discretion in determining the appropriate remedy within ABA’s professional standards.205 Trial courts should employ this
discretion in protecting the integrity of the legal field while ensuring the
assembly of a fair and impartial jury.
D.

Preserving the Peremptory Challenge

Peremptory challenges have a long history dating back to Roman
times.206 Congress adopted its peremptory challenge procedure from English
197. See Marder, supra note 161, at 1185.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. ABA, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS (2005), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/american_jury/principles.authcheckdam.pdf.
201. Id. at 13.
202. Id. at 15.
203. See id. at 15–16.
204. Id. at 16.
205. See id.
206. Richard Gabriel, Understanding Bias: Preserving Peremptory Challenges, Preventing Their Discriminatory Use, and Providing Fairer and More Impartial Juries, CIV. JURY
PROJECT AT NYU SCH. OF L., https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/understanding-biaspreserving-peremptory-challenges-preventing-their-discriminatory-use-and-providing-fairerand-more-impartial-juries/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2020).
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common law.207 Although England has long abandoned its use of peremptory challenges, peremptory challenges continue to be a topic of debate in our
country.208 In Justice Marshall’s concurrence in Batson, he asserted that the
only way to eliminate racial discrimination from jury selection was the eradication of peremptory challenges.209 Although this is a viable solution, peremptory challenges do serve a purpose, known as jury impartiality, in the
adversarial process.210
Jury impartiality serves two purposes.211 First, it allows attorneys, both
prosecutors and defense counsel, to have an “arbitrary prerogative” to strike
a juror who is perceived to have a prejudice.212 Second, a peremptory challenge can protect a defendant from the results of a failed challenge for
cause.213 These purposes of jury impartiality cannot be ignored when deciding whether to modify or ban this crucial aspect of criminal procedure. The
elimination of peremptory challenges may not embody the spirit of jury impartiality granted by the Sixth Amendment.214
Jury impartiality is not the only concern. Richard Gabriel, an advisor
for the Civil Jury Project at New York University School of Law, contended
that to eliminate racial discrimination in jury selection, the processes must
be revised, not the rules.215 Although this would require much time, research, and a huge overhaul of the voir dire process, a successful change
will salvage peremptory challenges while steering litigants away from using
generalizations to predict juror’s potential biases.216
It is not the peremptory challenges themselves that are unlawful. It is
how they are employed. Eradication of peremptory challenges will eliminate
their use as a racially discriminatory tool, but it will also deprive those lawabiding attorneys of the challenges’ benefits.217 Peremptory challenges have
become a huge part of the United States’ adversarial system by providing
attorneys the opportunity to play an active role in picking their fact finder.218
207. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214 (1965).
208. See Gabriel, supra note 206.
209. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986).
210. See Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377, 377; see also Juli Vyverberg, The
Peremptory Challenge: Substance Worth Preserving?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 435, 435 (1994).
211. Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 11 (2014).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Vyverberg, supra note 210, at 435.
215. See Gabriel, supra note 206.
216. See id. (asserting that further research and understanding of bias is necessary to
implement effective change to the voir dire process).
217. See id.
218. See Morrison, supra note 211, at 11.
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Banning the use of peremptory challenges is simply too harsh of remedy and
should only be considered after exhausting other options.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Flowers was an extreme set of circumstances, it was not an
isolated case of racial discrimination in jury selection.219 Batson provides the
process for addressing discriminatory intent in voir dire, but it falls short of
providing an adequate remedy.220 An adequate remedy will deter Batson
violators from committing the violation again and encourage lawful and
professional conduct during voir dire.221 Sanctions and disqualification from
participation in the re-trial will achieve these goals while preserving the
benefits of peremptory challenges.222 Justice and the integrity of the legal
profession demand change in the country’s criminal justice system, and it
begins with changing the culture of prosecution.
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